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Saltzburg: Corporate and Related Attorney-Client Privilege Claims: A Suggest

CORPORATE AND RELATED ATTORNEYCLIENT PRIVILEGE CLAIMS: A SUGGESTED
APPROACH
Stephen A. Saltzburg*
Corporations are often entitled to the same kinds of protection
that the law affords natural persons. For example, such constitutional provisions as the first amendment protection of speech,' the
fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures, 2 and the protection against undue interference by state government in interstate commerce, 3 are all applicable to corporations.5
4
Statutes like the Sherman Antitrust Act and various labor laws

impose constraints and afford protections that are similar for corporations and natural persons. In certain areas, however, corporations
are treated differently under the law than are natural persons. For
instance, the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination 6
and the privileges and immunities clause of article IV7 do not extend
to corporations. In addition, tax laws may differentiate between corporations and natural persons," while other statutes may impose special burdens on corporate enterprises. 9
In the law of evidence, corporations are generally treated simi* Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980);
First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
2. See, e.g., Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
3. See, e.g., New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982); Kassel v.
Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).

5. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1982); Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Title VII, § 701, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a),(b) (1982).

6. See, e.g., Grant & Burlingame v. United States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913); Wheeler v.
United States, 226 U.S. 478 (1913); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
7. See, e.g., Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868); Bank of Augusta v. Earle,

38 U.S. 517, 13 Pet. 519 (1839).
8. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG,
ed. 1980).
9.

CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS

21 (5th

For example, federal venue provisions may impose greater burdens on corporations

than on natural persons to defend suits. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1982).
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larly to natural persons; corporations bear no special burdens and
claim no special privileges. 10 One particular privilege corporations
and natural persons claim in common is the attorney-client privilege,
the oldest and most secure evidentiary privilege."' While the scope of
this privilege for natural persons is now fairly well established, there
has been sharp disagreement over the best way to implement the
privilege so that corporations receive appropriate, but not excessive,
protection.12 Two competing approaches-one often referred to as
the "control group" approach,13 and the other probably best described as a14 "scope of employment" approach 1 -- have predominated. Recently, the United States Supreme Court rejected the control group concept for federal courts,18 thereby agreeing with most of
the commentators who have made recent proposals regarding the
corporate attorney-client privilege.1 7 Contrary to the suggestion of
such writers, however, the Supreme Court failed to adopt a scope of
employment test to govern future federal litigation." Instead, it left
lower federal courts with little to guide them in their determinations
of the scope of the corporate privilege.
State courts have also struggled to delineate the proper parameters of the corporate attorney-client privilege. Some states have
10. For example, both natural persons and corporations can produce business records
that are admissible as evidence, See FED. R. EvID. 803(6), and statements by a natural person's agent relating to his agency are as readily admitted against the principal as are statements by a corporation's employees against the corporation, See FED. R. EViD. 801(d)(2)(D).
11. See Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals:Lawyers and Psychiatrists,66 VA. L.
REv. 597, 603-04 (1980) (discussing the policies underlying the attorney-client privilege and
citing various authorities therein); Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953 (1956). One district court held that a corporation has no claim to
the privilege, Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill.), affd
on rehearing,209 F. Supp. 321 (1962), but the decision was reversed on appeal, 320 F.2d 314
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
12. Almost every major article on corporate privilege begins by indicating the disagreement among various courts on the scope of the privilege. See, e.g., Gergacz, Attorney-Corporate Client Privilege, 37 Bus. LAw. 461 (1982).
13. For an explanation of this approach, see infra text accompanying notes 40-49.
14. There are variations on the scope of employment test. It may also be referred to as
the "subject matter" test. See Gergacz, supra note 12, at 491-96. This is why the word "a" is
used, and not the word "the".
15. The scope of employment approaches are described infra text accompanying notes
50-63.
16. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); see infra notes 67-80 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE I 503(b)[04]
(1981); 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 212 (1978 & Supp. 1983).
18. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396-97 (1981).
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adopted the control group approach, by rule19 or by judicial decision, 20 while others have adopted a scope of employment concept by
judicial decision. 1 There are also states that have tried (as has the
United States Supreme Court) to avoid stating a general rule for
corporate privilege. 2 As a result, there is continuing uncertainty as
to how much protection the attorney-client privilege should provide
corporations.
No matter what scope the attorney-client privilege is ultimately
afforded, it is clear that it is intended to assure clients that the information they communicate to their attorneys in confidence will not be
disclosed to others. The less certain the scope of the privilege, the
less reliance clients can place upon it. An ill-defined attorney-client
privilege thus complicates the lawyer-client relationship and frustrates the very goal such a privilege is intended to achieve-to facilitate attorney-client communications. There is, therefore, a need for a
clear rule of corporate privilege. This article attempts to state such a
rule, providing corporations with the appropriate amount of protection, as measured by the basic rationale that supports the privilege
for both natural persons and artificial entities.
The article takes six analytical steps to justify its suggested approach to the corporate attorney-client privilege. First, it briefly discusses the rationale that justifies affording any person the privilege.2 3
Second, it applies the rationale to corporations in order to explain
why they should be entitled to the same sort of protection as natural
persons.2 4 Third, it explains the factor that complicates implementation of the privilege in the corporate context.2 5 Fourth, it demonstrates that what appears to be a special problem for corporations is
19. See, e.g., ALASKA R. EvID. 503; ME. R. EvID. 502; N.D. R. EVID. 502; see also
UNIF. R. EVID. 502(a)(2), 13 U.L.A. 249 (1980) ("A representative of the client is one having
authority to obtain professional legal services, or to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto,

on behalf of the client."); UNIF. R. EvID. 502(b), 13 U.L.A. 250 (1980) ("General rule of
privilege," equating communications by "representatives of the client" with those of the client

himself, for purposes of determining when privilege will attach.).
20. See, e.g., Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89 Ill. App. 2d 103, 432
N.E.2d 250 (1982).
21. See, e.g., D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723, 388 P.2d 700, 36
Cal. Rptr. 468 (1964). Chadbourne,and its relationship to other approaches to corporate priv-

ilege, is discussed in Goodgame, Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: Should You Make an
Extra Copy for the Plaintiffl, 56 CAL. ST. B.J. 186 (1981).
22. See, e.g., DEL. R. EvID. 502(a)(2); Leer v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry., 308
N.W.2d 305, 308-09 (Minn. 1981).

23. See infra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
24.

See infra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.

25. See infra notes 37-84 and accompanying text.
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really not very different from a problem that confronts all clients
who employ lawyers." Fifth, it shows why neither the control group
concept nor a scope of employment test of corporate privilege is consistent with the rationale for the privilege. Sixth, it recommends a
new approach, which is subsequently applied to the cases discussed
throughout the article. 28 A brief explanation is then presented as to
how the approach may be extended in certain situations to control
the scope of the attorney-client privilege for noncorporate clients
that use agents to seek legal advice.2 9
I.

THE RATIONALE FOR THE PRIVILEGE GENERALLY

In our legal system, people are presumed to know the law and
are expected to obey it. The law is complicated, however, and without adequate legal advice, it is doubtful that many nonlawyers would
find it easy to conduct their affairs in conformity with legal rules.
For most people, therefore, reliance on counsel is essential if they are
to comply with legal requirements.
Furthermore, in our system, persons who believe that the law
has been violated and who wish to see the law enforced against a
violator are required to specify the alleged violation in accordance
with certain designated procedures. Similarly, those charged with
the law are expected to answer charges brought against them in a
designated manner. Some knowledge of the law is necessary, of
course, to formulate charges and responses, both to assure that there
is substance to the position asserted and to conform to procedural
requirements. Because the law is complex, and procedures are often
intricate, most people need the help of a lawyer to initiate and to
defend against legal proceedings.
The attorney-client privilege is some recognition of how essential legal advice may be when people attempt to learn about legal
requirements or to dispute whether legal rules have been violated. It
is a promise that when people seek advice from someone trained in
the law, they can be candid; they can express their beliefs, fears,
concerns, and facts without fear of disclosure, as long as they seek in
good faith to conform their conduct to legal requirements, either in
presenting a claim that someone has failed to comply with the law,
26. See infra notes 85-114 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 115-23 and accompanying text.
28.
29.

See infra notes 124-60 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 161-78 and accompanying text.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol12/iss2/3

4

Saltzburg: Corporate and Related Attorney-Client Privilege Claims: A Suggest

19841

CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

or in defending against such a claim.3 0
Without this promise, people who seek legal advice might reasonably be concerned that every communication with an attorney
could possibly create "evidence" that might be used by others

against them. Such concern could lead to suppression of information
which, in turn, could lead to poor legal advice. If there were no privilege, conscientious lawyers, employed to provide assistance to clients,
might well warn their clients to be careful about what they say. To
avoid creating adverse evidence, clients and their lawyers might

make an extensive effort to cast statements in a hypothetical form, in
the hope that any person with an adverse interest would find the
statements too nebulous to be useful. Fear of creating adverse evidence might lead clients to refrain from revealing facts that would

actually be helpful to them if only disclosed to their lawyers. 1
The attorney-client privilege represents a policy judgment that
clients should be encouraged to seek legal advice and that lawyers

should be fully and completely informed by their clients when rendering that advice. Although it is conceivable that if there were no

privilege clients would reveal almost as much information to their
attorneys as they would when a privilege protects them, it is not un-

reasonable to assume that some communications would be repressed.
Indeed, some potential clients might avoid lawyers altogether, either
because of misinformation about the law or because of a misguided

notion as to how the information they possess might affect their legal
position. Moreover, it is not unreasonable to assume that clients
30. It is important that the litigant use the privilege in good faith. If a client seeks an
attorney's help in what the client knows or should know is a criminal or fraudulent effort, the
privilege will not attach. See 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 17, 503(d)(1)[01];
S. SALTZBERG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 248 (3d ed. 1982).
Where the crime or fraud exception deprives a litigant of the privilege, he is also likely to lose
work product protection. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 802-03 (3d
Cir. 1979); see infra text accompanying notes 168-72.
31. The need for confidentiality is discussed at greater length in Saltzburg, supra note
11, at 605-09.
As this article proceeds, it might appear that too much emphasis is being placed on clients
who seek legal advice with an eye toward possible or actual litigation. This emphasis, however,
is for good reason. If litigation-including various public investigations in which witnesses are
called to testify and documents are sought-never eventuates, the privilege is irrelevant. The
privilege only has relevance when someone wants disclosure in a tribunal of some sort of what
the client has said. Outside of formal proceedings, the attorney is expected by the canons of
professional conduct to preserve confidentiality, MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITy Canon 4 (1980), and failure to do so might result in disciplinary action or even tort liability. If someone is guaranteed that no tribunal will ever seek to discover confidential communications, that person has no need to be concerned about the presence or absence of a privilege.
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might be inclined to reveal only that information about which they
were absolutely certain, fearing that premature communications
might adversely affect them in the future. To encourage full disclosure of information by clients, the attorney-client privilege creates a
zone of confidentiality in which clients and lawyers may communicate, 32 free of concern that their communications will become available to persons with an interest in using the communications as evidence against the clients.
Nothing in the attorney-client privilege, however, allows clients
to withhold answers to questions, during discovery or other proceed-

ings, about events or facts of which they may have knowledge. 3
Rather, the privilege only guarantees that the clients' specific statements made in confidence to counsel about those events or facts can
be kept secret.34
An example will not only illustrate this point, but will also highlight its importance. Assume that Shirley owns a bar, that she recently did some repair work on the sidewalk in front of that bar, and
that several customers subsequently tripped on the sidewalk where
the repairs had been made. Shirley, who had decided that she would
not pay high insurance premiums on the establishment, is a self-insurer concerned about her potential liability to injured customers.
She meets with her lawyer to discuss the repairs, the accidents, and
whether she should do additional repair work on the sidewalk.
Shirley's specific conversations with her attorney are privileged.
She has the right to refuse to reveal and to prevent the attorney from
revealing the communications she made to her attorney in seeking
legal advice. If Shirley is sued by the customers, the privilege does
32. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) ("The lawyer-client privilege
rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the client's reasons
for seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried out."). It is not always the
case, however, that a lawyer's communications will be privileged. Since the purpose of the
privilege is to encourage the client to be open and candid, disclosure of attorney communications that might tend to reveal the client's statements are protected, but other attorney communications may not be. See, e.g., In re Fischel, 557 F.2d 209, 212 (9th Cir. 1977) ("summaries of a client's business transactions with third parties compiled by an attorney from
unprivileged facts" are not entitled to the protection of the attorney-client privilege); Attorney
Gen. of the United States v. Covington & Burling, 430 F. Supp. 1117, 1121-22 (D.D.C. 1977)
(privilege denied where protecting communications would not significantly "benefit the administration of justice").
33. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981) ("The privilege only
protects disclosure of communications; it does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by
those who communicated with the attorney ....").
34. Id.; see Saltzburg, Communications Falling Within the Attorney-Client Privilege,
66 IOWA L. REv. 811, 817-18 (1981).
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not enable her to refuse, during discovery or trial, to answer questions about the repairs to the sidewalk or about what she observed at
or near the time of the accidents. Moreover, any knowledge that she
had before going to the attorney can also be explored. Thus, only her
communications to counsel are protected.35
This illustrates that the attorney-client privilege enables clients
to communicate with lawyers with the assurance that their communications will not be used by others as additional evidence against
them, but does not conceal any information that would have been
available to other persons if legal advice had never been sought.3 6
Shirley might never have chosen to seek legal advice if there were no
privilege available to protect her conversations. Since she did seek
legal advice, and the privilege protects her communications to counsel, she benefits from the privilege, while any person with an adverse
interest is in no worse position than if Shirley had never talked to
counsel.
From this analysis, the basic rationale for the privilege emerges:
It encourages people who might be reluctant to seek legal advice in
the absence of such a privilege to consult and to be forthright with
counsel, without depriving others with adverse interests of any evidence that would have been clearly available had legal advice not
been sought.
II.

THE RATIONALE APPLIED TO CORPORATIONS

To best illustrate the rationale of the attorney-client privilege as
it is applied to corporations, a variation of the previous hypothetical
is helpful. Assume that Shirley, anxious to avail herself of the limited liability feature of a corporate structure, has incorporated her
bar business. All of her assets are devoted to the corporation and any
litigation will be against the corporation. Shirley has, of course, virtually the same need for legal advice whether her business is a sole
proprietorship or a corporation. Absent a privilege, her fears about
having her communications used as evidence against her would be
35. The Supreme Court emphasized this fact in Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383, 395 (1981).
36. A more lengthy discussion of why the privilege should be designed to encourage new
communications, but not to hide existing information and evidence, may be found in
Saltzburg, supra note 34. No one can deny, of course, that unscrupulous lawyers may work
with perjurious clients to foster and suborn perjury under the secrecy of the privilege. The
existence of the privilege suggests that lawyers are assumed trustworthy in a system of justice
that makes it so essential for them to be consulted by lay persons. If this assumption were not
made, the privilege probably could not be justified.
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approximately the same whatever the form of the business. She is
worried that she may suffer a loss if she or the corporation is sued
successfully. Thus, she will want to be assured that she does not increase the likelihood that she will lose a lawsuit by making statements to counsel that may be used against her. The existence of a
privilege enables her to communicate with counsel in order to defend
any suit against the corporation, without making adverse parties any
worse off than they would be were she a sole proprietor who consulted counsel. Thus, the argument for the applicability of the privilege seems strong in this example, even though the client is a
corporation.
It is arguable, however, that when a business adopts a corporate
form in order to secure whatever advantages that form has to offer,
it should be forced to give up the attorney-client privilege. This argument might be warranted if corporations could not be sued or if they
had no real need to seek legal advice. Since they can be sued and
their liability can be substantial, they have at least the same need
as-and as a result of the special legal requirements imposed upon
corporations, probably even a greater need than-natural persons to
obtain legal help in order to conform their conduct to the requirements of law, and to bring and defend against suits. Someone like
Shirley has reason to be concerned about confidentiality, whether or
not her business is incorporated, and without a privilege she may be
reluctant to confide fully in her attorney. As long as Shirley has at
least the same need for the protection of the privilege when incorporated as she had as a sole proprietor, and persons with adverse interests suffer no greater detriment when her corporation avails itself of
the privilege to seek advice than when she herself does, the attorneyclient privilege should be fully applicable to protect Shirley's confidential communications to counsel on behalf of her corporation.
Shirley's is the strongest case for applying the attorney-client privilege to a corporation. She repaired the sidewalk, she decided whether
or not to hire an attorney, and she must choose what to tell her lawyer about her actions and observations. It is difficult to see how her
claim of privilege is any less compelling when the business is incorporated than when Shirley was a sole proprietor.
III. THE

COMPLICATING FACTOR

If this scenario is changed slightly, however, the real problem of
implementing the privilege for corporations becomes apparent. Assume that Shirley has incorporated her business and that she is the
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chief officer of the corporation in charge of purchases, advertising,
and other related concerns, but that she does not actually do the
physical labor at the bar. Mary is the bartender, and Jean does the
repair work. Mary reports to Shirley that customers have had accidents on the sidewalk after it was repaired. In this situation, although Shirley can count on her corporate structure to insulate herself from personal liability- she is still justifiably concerned that the
corporation might be sued. Hence, she arranges for Mary and Jean
to tell the corporation's lawyer what they know about the customers'
accidents and the repair of the sidewalk.
The difference between this hypothetical situation and the preceding one is that while Shirley remains responsible for selecting the
lawyer, paying for legal advice, and deciding whether or not to accept the advice, the communications to counsel will now be made by
two other people. Because Mary and Jean are employed by the corporation, if they speak to counsel on behalf of the corporation at
Shirley's direction, it might seem that the communication is from
the client, i.e., the corporation to its lawyer. On the other hand,
Mary and Jean are not seeking legal advice, so they appear to have a
motivation that is different from ordinary clients. For example,
Mary may not have the same concerns as Jean, since Mary is not
worried about being sued. 7 Shirley may be more concerned than
both Mary and Jean."8 Thus, the complicating factor arises when the
simple situation of a corporation controlled by the very person who
consults with counsel on the corporation's behalf changes to a setting
in which the person or persons who communicate with counsel are
different from those who decide what counsel should attempt to
learn and what counsel should do with any information that is
learned. This factor is responsible for dividing the courts into two
different conceptual approaches-namely, control group and scope of
employment-in their attempts to define the limits of the corporate
attorney-client privilege.3 9
37. Since Jean did the repair work, she would be personally liable for her own negligence. Although Mary does not have this concern, she might fear personal liability for failure
to warn, but her fear is likely to be less than Jean's.
38. Theoretically, Jean might be joined or made the exclusive defendant. In addition,
the employer might theoretically have a right to indemnity from Jean if Jean was negligent.
The employer's concern for employee morale and the limitations on Jean's resources, however,
might make the employer reluctant to sue.
39. This complicating factor would also exist in the hypothetical in which Shirley is a
sole proprietor if it is assumed that someone other than Shirley worked on the sidewalk and
talked with counsel. Given the large number of natural persons who retain counsel, it is odd
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The Control Group Approach

The control group test finds its origins in City of Philadelphiav.
Westinghouse Electric Corp. (Westinghouse II),o decided in 1962.
The plaintiff in an antitrust case sought detailed information from
Westinghouse Electric Corporation ("Westinghouse") as to meetings
attended by its officials and competitors during which prices, terms
of sales, and territories might have been discussed."1 Westinghouse
claimed attorney-client privilege on the ground that the information
relevant to the plaintiff's questions was given to counsel by corporate
officers and employees in confidence."2 The Westinghouse II district
court adopted the view that:
[I]f the employee making the communication, of whatever rank he
may be, is in a position to control or even to take a substantial part
in a decision about any action which the corporation may take
upon the advice of the attorney, or if he is an authorized member
of a body or group which has that authority, then, in effect, he is
(or personifies) the corporation when he makes his disclosure to the
lawyer and the privilege would apply."3
Communications by other employees would not be privileged. This
position, which the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit approved as late as 197944 (shortly before the Supreme
Court rejected the control group approach 5), is based on a concern
that an excessively broad corporate privilege would give corporate
parties an unwarranted litigation advantage and might permit a considerable amount of evidence to be concealed under the umbrella of
that there are few reported cases on the attorney-client privilege, especially recent ones, involving natural persons whose employees or agents communicate with attorneys. For this reason,
discussion of Shirley as a sole proprietor with employees is postponed until the proper scope of
the corporate attorney-client privilege has been identified. At that point it will be clear how the
sole proprietor with employees should be treated. See infra notes 161-78 and accompanying
text.
40. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.) (Westinghouse If), petitionfor writs of mandamus and
prohibition denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963).
41. City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830, 830 (E.D. Pa.
1962) (Westinghouse 1).
42. See id. at 830-31.
43. Westinghouse II, 210 F. Supp. at 485.
44. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1234-35 (3d Cir. 1979).
45. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (19 1). The Sixth Circuit's opinion in
Upjohn had agreed with the Third Circuit's control group approach. United States v. Upjohn
Co., 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd and remanded, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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the corporate attorney-client privilege."6
Although there is reason to be worried about the scope of corporate privilege, the district court in Westinghouse II may have been
unduly concerned about the suppression of evidence that would flow
from a broader view of the privilege.' 7 As noted earlier, corporate
officials could have been compelled to answer any questions about
meetings and discussions about which they had knowledge.'8 Furthermore, the current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would require a corporation to do some investigation in order to answer interrogatories. 9 While specific communications to attorneys might be
privileged, a corporation still may be bound to answer questions
about who did what, when, where, and so on. Facts available to the
corporation are not immune from discovery simply because they
have been related to an attorney.
B.

The Scope of Employment Concept

The broader view of the attorney-client privilege, referred to
here as a scope of employment approach, is well illustrated by
Harper & Row Publishers v. Decker,50 decided eight years after
Westinghouse I. In Harper & Row, shortly after a number of present and former corporate employees testified before a federal grand
jury investigating possible antitrust violations in the publishing industry, corporate counsel debriefed the employees and prepared
memoranda relating to the debriefings.5 1 The plaintiffs in a civil antitrust case sought discovery of the debriefing memoranda, and the
corporation resisted, inter alia, on the ground of attorney-client privilege.52 The court of appeals found that certain debriefing memoranda were privileged. 53 It went beyond the control group test and
46. Some of the pro and con arguments for narrowing a corporate privilege are explored
in Nath, Upjohn: A New Prescriptionfor the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product
Defenses in Administrative Investigations, 30 BUFFALO L. REv. 11, 38-54 (1981).
47. Of course, there is still good reason to be concerned about extending the corporate
privilege beyond the rationale that supports it. See infra text accompanying notes 136-37.

48. That the corporation may have been trying to avoid answering questions about
events, as well as trying to protect communications, is evident in an earlier opinion in the
Westinghouse case. 205 F. Supp. 830, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (Westinghouse 1).
49. See FED. R. Civ. P. 33.
50. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), a.fd by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348

(1971).
51.

Id. at 490.

52. Id.
53. Five of the six debriefing memoranda involved in the proceedings were held to be
protected by the attorney-client privilege. As for the sixth, good cause was found to exclude it
from work product protection. Id. at 492.
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held that a communication by a corporate employee to counsel is
privileged "where the employee makes the communication at the direction of his superiors in the corporation and where the subject matter upon which the attorney's advice is sought by the corporation and
dealt with in the communication is the performance by the employee
of the duties of his employment. ' 54 The Supreme Court affirmed by
55
an equally divided vote.
Westinghouse and Harper & Row are important cases since
they are seminal and oft-cited statements of the two most significant
approaches to implementing the corporate attorney-client privilege.
The division on the Supreme Court in Harper & Row mirrored the
division of authority in the lower courts.
Eight more years passed with no consensus developing as to the
preferable approach to corporate privilege when an en banc United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in DiversifiedIndustries v. Meredith,56 made an effort to establish a test of privilege that
might receive wider acceptance. The court endeavored to restate the
scope of employment test to assure that the privilege did not provide
corporations with a device to hide information under the guise of
seeking legal advice.5
Diversified Industries, Inc. ("Diversified"), which engaged in
the manufacturing and processing of nonferrous metals, was concerned that its employees may have maintained a "slush fund" to
bribe purchasing agents of its customers. 58 It hired outside counsel to
conduct an investigation and to report its findings to the board of
directors.59 Diversified's president advised employees that "he would
take any steps necessary or appropriate to insure employee cooperation" with the investigation.60 Counsel interviewed employees, compiled a report, and submitted it to the board. 61 Discovery of this report was sought in a lawsuit by one of the customers, who alleged
54. Id. at 491-92.
55. 400 U.S. 348 (1971). Because of the divided vote, the Advisory Committee that
submitted proposed rules of evidence to the Supreme Court, after first proposing a control
group test in a draft of its rules, see FED. R. EVID. 503 advisory committee note, 51 F.R.D.
315, 363 (1971) (rev. draft of proposed rule, not enacted), decided not to write a test for
corporate privilege into its proposed attorney-client privilege rule. See FED. R. EvID. 503 advisory committee note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 237 (1972) (proposed rule, not enacted).
56. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (rehearing en banc).
57. See Id. at 609.
58. Id. at 607.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 607-08.
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that Diversified had conspired with the customer's employees to defraud the customer. 62 The court set forth the following test for privileged communications:
We feel that the . . attorney-client privilege is applicable to
an employee's communication if (1) the communication was made
for the purpose of securing legal advice; (2) the employee making
the communication did so at the direction of his corporate superior;,
(3) the superior made the request so that the corporation could
secure legal advice; (4) the subject matter of the communication is
within the scope of the employee's corporate duties; and (5) the
communication is not disseminated beyond those persons who, because of the corporate structure, need to know its contents.6 3
Applying this test to the facts, the court found that the report, which
64
summarized the interviews with the employees, was privileged.
While the decision was welcomed by some commentators, 5 it
failed to persuade those courts preferring the control group test.66
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to resolve the conflict in the
67
circuits in Upjohn Co. v. United States.

Upjohn Company ("Upjohn"), which manufactured and sold
pharmaceuticals in the United States and abroad, became aware
that some of its employees might have been making "'questionable
payments'" to foreign officials in order to secure business.68 Pursuant to Upjohn's request for an investigation, the company's attorneys
prepared a letter containing a questionnaire which was sent, over the
signature of the Chairman of the Board, to all general and area
62. Id. at 606-07.
63. Id. at 609.
64. Id. at 611.
65. See 2 J. WEINsTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 17, 503(b)[04], at 503-54 (noting
that Diversified "explicitly adopted the modified subject matter test proposed in this Treatise"); Graham, Evidence and Trial Advocacy Workshop: The Lawyer-Client Privilege, 19
CRim. L. BULL. 513, 518 (1983) (Diversifiedcharacterized as an "appealing resolution").
66. See, e.g., United States v. Amerada Hess Corp., 619 F.2d 980, 986-87 (3d Cir.
1980); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979). For a more comprehensive analysis of the success of the control group test prior to Upjohn, see Stern, AttorneyClient Privilege:Supreme Court Repudiates the Control Group Test, 67 A.B.A. J. 1142, 1144
(1981).
67. 449 U.S. 383 (1981). One commentator referred to the Upjohn case as the perfect
vehicle for litigating the corporate privilege. Recent Developments, Evidence-Upjohn v.
United States-CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege,7 J. CORP. L. 359, 378 (1982). In fact, it
may have been the worst possible set of facts for dispassionate consideration of the scope of the
privilege as could be imagined. See infra note 81.
68. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386.
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managers. 69 The letter, stating that the Chairman had asked counsel
to conduct an investigation into certain payments, instructed employees to respond, but to keep all information "'highly confidential.' ,,70
Counsel also interviewed the recipients of the questionnaire as well
as other officers and employees. 1 Subsequently, Upjohn submitted a
preliminary report to the Securities and Exchange Commission and
forwarded a copy of the report to the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS"). 7 2 The report revealed that certain questionable payments
were made. 3 Upjohn also supplied IRS agents with the names of all
those interviewed and all those who had responded to the questionnaire. 4 Afterwards, the IRS, which had initiated an investigation
into the tax consequences of the payments, attempted to subpoena
all the written questionnaires as well as notes and memoranda of the
interviews with the employees.75 Upjohn resisted the subpoena,
claiming that the documents were protected by both the attorneyclient privilege and the work product doctrine.7 When Upjohn
sought review of the district court decision rejecting the privilege
claim, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
adopted a control group approach and remanded the case with the
77
instruction that the district court apply that approach to the facts.
Dissatisfied, Upjohn sought and obtained a writ of certiorari in the
Supreme Court, which proceeded to strike a death blow to the control group test in federal courts. Unlike the equally divided Court
that left the court of appeals' decision in Harper & Row undisturbed,8 the Upjohn Court was almost unanimous. 9 Justice Rehnquist reasoned for the Court as follows:
69. Id.
70. Id. at 387.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 387-88.
76. Id. at 388. Under the analysis of attorney-client privilege offered in this article, the
work product argument is clearly better than the attorney-client privilege claim. The reason
will be apparent shortly. See infra notes 99-123 and accompanying text.
77. United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd and remanded,
449 U.S. 383 (1981).
78. Decker v. Harper & Row Publishers, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
79. There were no dissents. Only Chief Justice Burger departed slightly from the majority opinion when he concurred in part only and also concurred in the judgment. He agreed
with the rejection of the control group test, but preferred to state a more definitive test of
privilege than did the majority. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 402 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
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The narrow scope given the attorney-client privilege by the
court below not only makes it difficult for corporate attorneys to
formulate sound advice when their client is faced with a specific
legal problem but also threatens to limit the valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client's compliance with the law. In
light of the vast and complicated array of regulatory legislation
confronting the modern corporation, corporations, unlike most individuals, "constantly go to lawyers to find out how to obey the
law". . . The test adopted by the court below is difficult to apply
in practice, though no abstractly formulated and unvarying "test"
will necessarily enable courts to decide questions such as this with
mathematical precision. But if the purpose of the attorney-client
privilege is to be served, the attorney and client must be able to
predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be protected. . . .The very terms of the test adopted by
the court below suggests the unpredictability of its application ....
The Court of Appeals declined to extend the attorney-client
privilege beyond the limits of the control group test for fear that
doing so would entail severe burdens on discovery and create a
broad "zone of silence" over corporate affairs. Application of the
attorney-client privilege to communications such as those involved
here, however, puts the adversary in no worse position than if the
communications had never taken place. The privilege only protects
disclosure of communications; it does not protect disclosure of the
underlying facts by those who communicated with the attorney
Needless to say, we decide only the case before us, and do not
undertake to draft a set of rules which should govern the challenges
to investigatory subpoenas. Any such approach would violate the
spirit of Federal Rule of Evidence 501. . . .While such a "caseby-case" basis may to some slight extent undermine desirable certainty in the boundaries of the attorney-client privilege, it obeys the
spirit of the Rules. At the same time we conclude that the narrow
"control group test" sanctioned by the Court of Appeals in this
case cannot, consistent with "the principles of the common law as
. ..interpreted .. .in the light of reason and experience," Fed.
Rule Evid. 501, govern the development of the law in this area.80
80.

Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392-97 (citations omitted).

FED. R. EVID. 501 provides in relevant part that:

Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to

statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political
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At first, this reasoning might appear to incorporate the basic
rationale for the privilege as set forth earlier: The privilege encouraged Upjohn to provide information to its counsel without placing other persons, particularly the IRS, in a worse position than if
Upjohn had never asked counsel to prepare a report concerning the
"'questionable payments.' "81 The Upjohn reasoning, however, appears to be strikingly similar to an analysis appropriate in typical
work product claims. This similarity, once fully developed below, will
explain why ultimately Upjohn inadvertently departs from the true
rationale for the attorney-client privilege. This similarity will also
indicate why the scope of employment test is not consistent with the
basic rationale for the attorney-client privilege. Although the Supreme Court has not adopted this or any other test, there are signs
that the factors identified by the Seventh Circuit in Harper & Row
Publishers v. Decker,8 2 and by the Eighth Circuit in Diversified Industries v. Meredith8" may be the same as, or at least very similar
to, the factors that the Supreme Court would use to assess corporate
subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience.
Upjohn is unusual in that the Court took an expansive view of the attorney-client privilege,
something it had not done when it analyzed other privileges. See, e.g., Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (limiting witness-spouse privilege); United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 705-07 (1974) (refusing to sustain absolute presidential privilege); Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (refusing to grant reporters special first amendment testimonial
privilege).
81. Although this article argues that the privilege should not apply here, see infra text
accompanying notes 100-23, it is apparent that the IRS came to the Supreme Court in a
position that is hardly enviable. The IRS had asserted in the lower courts that the work product doctrine did not apply when it subpoenaed records. See 449 U.S. at 388-89, 397. Since the
Supreme Court has recognized a work product rule in both civil and criminal cases--see respectively, FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) and United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 236, 238
(1975)-it is extremely unlikely that the Court would have afforded the IRS more authority
than the federal courts. Although the government abandoned this argument in the Supreme
Court, the Court observed that it had been made below. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 397. In
addition, Upjohn appeared to he as cooperative as possible, short of abandoning its privilege
and work product claims. The government made no real claim or showing of need to discover
what it sought. Thus, it is unlikely that the Court would have sustained any argument by the
IRS to pierce the work product doctrine in order to obtain the subpoenaed information. Unfortunately, however, the Court went beyond the work product doctrine, which would have justified the same result in the case, and adopted a view of the attorney-client privilege that is not
supported by the rationale for the privilege. See infra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
82. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), affd by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348
(1971); see supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
83. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (rehearing en banc); see supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
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claims of attorney-client privilege." Once the scope of employment
test is rejected, it will become plain that, Upjohn notwithstanding,
the control group test, though flawed itself, comes closer to being
right than its principal competitor.
IV. THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE
The problem with the Upjohn analysis is best understood by reviewing one of the Supreme Court's earlier statements on the attorney-client privilege as enunciated in Hickman v. Taylor.8 5 Hickman
arose when a tug sank while towing a railroad "car float" across the
Delaware River, drowning five of nine crew members.8 6 The tug
owners hired counsel, who "privately interviewed the survivors and
took statements from them with an eye toward.

. .

anticipated liti-

gation. '' 87

Counsel also interviewed other persons who may have had
information about the accident and, in some instances, prepared
memoranda recording the statements obtained.8" Of the five claims
made on behalf of the deceased workers, four were settled and one
resulted in litigation in federal district court.89 The plaintiff requested copies of any written statements taken from crew members
and detailed summaries of any oral statements the crew members
made to defense counsel.90 Additional discovery requests sought
other defense memoranda concerning the case, as well as all oral or
84. The test proposed by the Chief Justice in his Upjohn concurrence is very similar to
that adopted in Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (rehearing
en banc). Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 402-03 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). In addition, the majority noted that the Upjohn employees spoke to counsel at the
direction of their superiors, for the purpose of having the corporation obtain legal advice, when
the information the employees had was unavailable from top management and related to the
duties of the employees, and that the employees knew that they were speaking to enable the
company to obtain legal advice. Id. at 394. Even though the Court did not say that these
factors were all necessary or that they would be sufficient in all cases, they are the only factors
with which the lower courts can work. Furthermore, these factors resemble those used in Diversified Industries, 572 F.2d at 609, and are not very different from those first developed in
Harper & Row, 423 F.2d at 491-92.
For lower court application of Upjohn, see Baxter Travenol Laboratories v. Lemay, 89
F.R.D. 410, certified for interlocutory appeal, 514 F. Supp. 1156 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Eglin
Fed. Credit Union v. Cantor, Fitzgerald Securities Corp., 91 F.R.D. 414 (N.D. Ga. 1981); In
re International Sys. & Control Corp. Securities Litig., 91 F.R.D. 552 (S.D. Tex. 1981);
Royal Embassy v. Steamship Mount Dirfys, 537 F. Supp. 55 (E.D.N.C. 1981).
85. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
86. Id. at 498.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 498-99.
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written statements obtained by defense counsel.9 '
The defendant resisted discovery, claiming privilege and invasion of the attorney's private work. 92 Although the Hickman defendant failed to persuade the district court, 93 it ultimately was successful in both the court of appeals9 4 and the Supreme Court.95 The
Supreme Court devoted little space in its opinion to a discussion of
attorney-client privilege,9" concluding that:
[I]t suffices to note that the protective cloak of this privilege does
not extend to information which an attorney secures from a witness
while acting for his client in anticipation of litigation. Nor does this
privilege concern the memoranda, briefs, communications and
other writings prepared by counsel for his own use in prosecuting
his client's case; and it is equally unrelated to writings which reflect
an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal
97
theories.

In so concluding, the Supreme Court essentially agreed with the
plaintiff's argument that the attorney-client privilege was inapplicable because the statements obtained by the lawyer were secured
from third persons instead of from the attorney's clients.98
After finding that the attorney-client privilege was not availa98
ble, the Court sustained the judgment of the court of appeals by
relying on what is now known as the work product doctrine. The
Court reasoned that "[i]n performing his various duties ...it is
essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free
91. Id. at 499.
92. Id.
93. Hickman v. Taylor, 4 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1945), rev'd and remanded, 153 F.2d
212 (3d Cir. 1945), a~f'd, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
94. Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1945), affid, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
95. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
96. In the course of its analysis, the Court referred to an argument by the plaintiff that
an excessively broad attorney-client privilege would give corporationsan undue litigation advantage. Id. at 506. Although the Hickman plaintiff did, in fact, sue the corporate railroad
defendant, the issue of privilege arose specifically only in the context of the interrogatories
directed at the tug owners, a partnership. Id. at 498-99. The court's language about the corporate attorney-client privilege was, therefore, dicta.
97. Id. at 508.
98. See id. at 506. Some commentators have questioned why the Court reached this
result. See, e.g., Weissenberger, Toward Precisionin the Application of the Attorney-Client
Privilege for Corporations, 65 IowA L. REV. 899, 908 n.47 (1980); Simon, The AttorneyClient Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953, 959 n.20 (1956). It is only
possible to speculate at this point as to what the Court had in mind, but this article concludes
that the Court was correct in its approach. See infra text accompanying notes 179-83.
99. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 508.
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from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel."100
The Court found that lawyers' work is reflected in "interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible ways." ' 1
Although it recognized the need for lawyers to be able to work privately, the Court stopped short of affording absolute protection
against discovery of work product, especially written statements and
memoranda:
Where relevant and non-privileged facts remain hidden in an attorney's file and where production of those facts is essential to the
preparation of one's case, discovery may properly be had. Such
written statements and documents might, under certain circumstances, be admissible in evidence or give clues as to the existence
or location of relevant facts. Or they might be useful for purposes
of impeachment or corroboration. And production might be justified where the witnesses are no longer available or can be reached
only with difficulty.10 2

The Court seemed especially reluctant, however, to require an attorney to produce memoranda of oral statements made by witnesses or
to require an attorney to testify about them.103 The Court concluded
that no "showing of necessity can be made under the circumstances
of this case so as to justify production,"104 thereby implying that in
some cases a showing might justify discovery. For a party to be successful, however, in justifying production, any showing would probably have to be stronger for discovery of oral statements than would
be required for discovery of written statements made by a witness to
an event. 10 5
100. Id. at 510-11.
101. Id. at 511.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 512-13.
104. Id. at 512.
105. The Hickman Court expressed several reasons for its particular reluctance in requiring an attorney to produce memoranda of oral statements obtained from witnesses.
"[F]orcing an attorney to repeat or write out all that witnesses have told him and to deliver
the account to his adversary gives rise to grave dangers of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness."
Id. at 512-13. Such practice would also force an attorney to testify, making the attorney
"much less an officer of the court and much more an ordinary witness." Id. at 513. According
to the Court, "[s]uch testimony could not qualify as evidence." Id. But see infra note 143
(discussing circumstances under which such testimony could be admissible). The Court also
expressed, throughout the opinion, a general concern for protecting the lawyer's mental
processes. See, e.g., 329 U.S. at 511, 514.
With the codification of more liberal evidentiary rules, which make it more likely that
oral statements would be admissible as evidence, see infra note 143, the most compelling of
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The work product doctrine, a version of which is incorporated in
rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,106 proved in the
Upjohn decision to be as important as the attorney-client privilege.
To the extent that the attorney-client privilege did not cover the lawyer's work in Upjohn, the Court suggested that the work product
doctrine might be applicable. 10 7 Relying on Hickman, the Upjohn
Court emphasized the heavy burden that must be borne by any litigant seeking to discover summaries of, or testimony about, oral
statements made to opposing counsel,108 leaving open the possibility
that it might never be possible to make a sufficient showing of
necessity.10 9
The work product doctrine rests on an assumption concerning
the way lawyers and their clients behave that is related to, but different from, the rationale for the attorney-client privilege. Underlying the work product rule is the belief that lawyers need to be able to
prepare for possible litigation by interviewing witnesses, preparing
memoranda, and doing other tasks without exposing their work to
opposing parties and their counsel. This belief is consistent with a
view of the adversary system that posits that a fair result is most
likely to be achieved if both sides work hard to prepare their cases
for presentation to a tribunal. When both sides seek out evidence
and develop approaches to a case, the tribunal that is called upon to
these concerns that currently remains is the need to protect the lawyer's mental impressions
and processes-the core of "work product." In fact, the Court in Upjohn read Hickman as
resting solely upon the need to protect the attorney's mental processes. See Upjohn Co. v.
United States, 449 U.S. 383, 400 (1981).
106. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) reads in pertinent part as follows:
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation
or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative
(including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon
a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in
the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain
the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of
such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories
of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.
107. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 401.
108. Id.
109. In Upjohn, the Supreme Court cited both lower court authority that holds "that no
showing of necessity can overcome protection of work product which is based on oral statements from witnesses," and conflicting authority that holds that there is no absolute bar to
discovery. Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). It declined to resolve the conflict,
however, assuming that if discovery would ever be allowed, "a far stronger showing of necessity" would be required than the government attempted to make in Upjohn. Id. at 401-02.
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decide the case is likely to discern opposing strengths and weak-

nesses. Furthermore, according to this adversarial notion, parties
should be encouraged to do independent work and should be able to

protect their work until such time as they are prepared to show it to
an opponent, which is often at trial. Although discovery inevitably
invades the privacy of preparation to some extent, as Justice Jackson
stated in his concurring opinion in Hickman, "[d]iscovery was
hardly intended to enable a learned profession to perform its functions either without wits or on wits borrowed from the adversary." 110
The principal difference between the attorney-client privilege
and the work product doctrine, in terms of the protection each provides, is that the privilege cannot be overcome by a showing of need,
whereas a showing of need may justify discovery of an attorney's
work product."' An attorney may accurately tell a client, therefore,
12
that communications made in confidence are absolutely protected."
Such a statement would be incorrect if made to a nonclient witness.
Why does an attorney's work product receive less protection
than privileged communications? The answer to this inquiry has two
parts. First, the attorney who seeks information from a nonclient
witness, as did the lawyer in Hickman, may want to use the information, perhaps even the very statement made by the witness, as evidence for his client and possibly against the witness. Were the work
110. 329 U.S. at 516 (Jackson, J., concurring).
111. Some courts, however, have balanced the need of shareholders in derivative actions
for disclosure of corporate-attorney communications against the need of corporate management for the protection of the privilege. The best known case is Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430
F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971) (allowing shareholders to "show
cause" why corporate management should not be permitted to claim privilege). Derivative
suits raise special questions as to who actually represents corporate interests, and are beyond
the scope of this article; corporate attorney-client privilege claims in shareholder actions are
examined in Saltzburg, Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholder Litigation and
Similar Cases: Garner Revisited, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV.(forthcoming 1984). For a recent
exchange of ideas on Garner's continuing viability since Upjohn, see Kirby, New Life for the
Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholder Litigation, 69 A.B.A. J. 174 (1983);
Lewis, Garner is Alive and Well in Securities Litigation, 69 A.B.A. J. 903 (1983); Walton &
Meagher, Attorney-Client Privilege in Stockholder Actions, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 10, 1983, at 15,
col. 3.
Garner issues may also arise where beneficiaries seek discovery of communications between their fiduciaries and the fiduciaries' lawyers. See, e.g., Quintel Corp. v. Citibank, 567 F.
Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see also Saltzburg, supra.
112. There are, of course, exceptions to the attorney-client privilege. For a discussion of
communications that are exempted from the privilege, see R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A
MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 697-98 (2d ed. 1982); see also FED. R. EvID. 503(d) advisory committee note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 236-37, 239-40 (1972) (proposed rule, not enacted;
detailing five "well established exceptions").
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product doctrine to guarantee witnesses that unless they consented
nothing they told counsel could be used as evidence, it would not
only undermine the incentives lawyers need to gather the information, but would frustrate clients in their efforts to prove their cases
and to refute those of their opponents. Second, witnesses who are not
clients are ordinarily not concerned in the same way that clients are
about the possible use of their statements against them. Although
the inconsistent testimony of a witness may damage the party who
urges the jury to believe the witness, the witness suffers little more
than embarrassment. The client usually is a party or potential party
who fears appearing inconsistent and is especially wary of saying
something that he might later contradict. A trier of fact may be
quicker to hold a person to what he has said when he is a litigant
rather than when he is a mere witness.
This analysis demonstrates that the witness who communicates
with counsel in the typical work product situation is not guaranteed
that the communications will remain private. Such a person could be
told that work product is not often disclosed, but conscientious counsel would have to add that disclosure will depend more on his client's
interest in using the communications, or on the need of an adverse
party for information, than on any privacy interest of the person
interviewed.
The lawyer who generates work product always does so at some
risk. For example, counsel may regret seeking information that is
ultimately more helpful to an opponent than to his client. The very
fact that there is a process for discovery, however, signifies that very
often counsel will not know ahead of time whether a nonclient witness is more likely to have helpful or harmful information. Arguably,
counsel should seek information even if he knows it to be harmful,
since an opponent may ultimately come upon it and the earlier it is
known, the more time his client has to cope with it. Of course, it is
also possible that in generating work product, a lawyer may discover
and may ultimately be forced to reveal information that an adversary might have otherwise missed. This is why lawyers who investigate run certain risks.
These risks may, in fact, inhibit some investigation. There may
be times, for example, when a lawyer will refrain from contacting a
potential witness out of fear that disclosure of the results of the contact may be required, and that disclosure may strengthen the opponent's case. It would be surprising, however, if the nonabsolute nature of the work product doctrine caused many lawyers to refrain
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from such investigation. This is true for two reasons: (1) the difficult
burden of establishing a need to discover work product rests on the
party who requests disclosure, and (2) the lawyer who generates the
work product has some control over the product through the way he
asks questions of witnesses. In fact, even though the Supreme Court
in both Hickman and Upjohn expressed concern over too liberal discovery of attorneys' work,113 the Court nevertheless retained the
nonabsolute character of the work product rule.:1 4 This suggests that
at least the Supreme Court believes that reasonable discovery of
work product will not unduly impair the functioning of an adversary
system.
This discussion of the work product doctrine helps to identify
what was missing in the Supreme Court's analysis of attorney-client
privilege in Upjohn. Justice Rehnquist reasoned that by upholding
the privilege claim the Court did not leave the government in a
worse position than it would have been in had Upjohn never conducted its investigation." 5 Although this is undoubtedly true, its importance in an analysis of attorney-client privilege is distorted. Previously, it was demonstrated that the attorney-client privilege rests on
not one, but two principal assumptions: first, that the person communicating with the lawyer-i.e., the client-might not be totally forthright absent a privilege; and second, that the recognition of a privilege to foster communication places an adverse party in no worse
position than if the client withheld information from his lawyer.',"
Only the second assumption is applicable in Upjohn, and is, by itself,
insufficient to warrant recognition of a privilege. In fact, it is the
same assumption that applies in all work product situations.
Every time an attorney obtains witness statements that are work
product, a claim could be made that had the statements not been
obtained, an adverse party would have been unable to discover them.
Therefore, discovery should never be permitted, since it would only
place an adverse party in a better position than he reasonably could
expect to be in. This reasoning, however, has not prevailed. A nonclient witness who gives a statement to an attorney cannot assume
that the statement will not be disclosed.117 The party who obtained it
113.

See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 397-400; Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-11.

114.

See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 401-02; Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511-12.

115.

See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395.

116.

See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.

117. The work product rules-FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) and FED. R. CRaM. P.
26.2-plainly establish that there is no absolute protection for a nonclient witness' statements
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may choose to disclose it and an adverse party may possibly discover
it. Where the witness is willing to give a statement under these circumstances, courts do not confer an absolute right of nondisclosure
upon the party who obtained the statement. 1 ' An opponent who
demonstrates sufficient need may discover the statement, because
courts assume that the statement was not dependent on confidentiality. In the noncorporate context, the only statements that courts
treat as absolutely privileged are those made by persons who understood that their statements would not be disclosed without their consent-i.e., communications between clients and their attorneys. Absent this understanding, witnesses' statements to attorneys are
classified, as were the statements in Hickman,' 9 as work product,
and thus are not afforded absolute confidentiality.
Therefore, the distinction between the work product doctrine
and the attorney-client privilege does not turn on the lawyer's fear of
creating potentially adverse evidence, which is present every time the
lawyer interviews any witness-client or not-but rather, on the
need to guarantee confidentiality as a condition of a person's talking
with a lawyer.
The defect, then, in the approach of the courts adopting a scope
of employment test as well as in Upjohn, is that the wrong question
is asked, at least implicitly, and that the question reflects an incorrect assumption. In their search to expand the privilege beyond the
narrow control group formulation, the courts seem to inquire
whether, without a guarantee of confidentiality, a lawyer will be reluctant to talk with employees of a corporation who have information-i.e., witness-employees.1 20 The courts arrive at an affirmative
answer. In the process, the courts assume that if lawyers would be
given to an attorney.
118.

See, e.g., Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511-12.

119. See id. at 509-10.
120. See, e.g., Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (rehearing
en banc), wherein the court criticized the control group test because
[t]he attorney dealing with a complex legal problem "is. . . faced with a 'Hobson's
choice'. If he interviews employees not having 'the very highest authority', their
communications to him will not be privileged. If, on the other hand, he interviews
only those with 'the very highest authority', he may find it extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to determine what happened."
Id, at 609, quoting Weinschel, CorporateEmployee Interviews and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 12 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 873, 876 (1971) (emphasis in original).
Assuming arguendo that the implicit question asked by the courts who employ a scope of
employment test is different than the one posed in text, it is, nevertheless, clear from these
courts' analyses that a focus on the privileges rationale is lacking.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol12/iss2/3

24

Saltzburg: Corporate and Related Attorney-Client Privilege Claims: A Suggest
1984]

CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT

PRIVILEGE

reluctant to talk with employees, employees would be equally reluctant to talk with lawyers. These courts fail to understand that the
premise of the nonabsolute character of the work product doctrine is
that lawyers who need information to provide legal advice will seek
it from knowledgeable witnesses, even without an absolute privilege
protecting their work. The courts also overlook the fact that an employee willing to talk with corporate counsel, who does not represent
the employee, is unlikely to be told that he has the right to control
the use of his statements. Because the employee may have different
interests from the corporation and its lawyer, if the employee-witness
is not assured that the lawyer represents his interests and will not
disclose his communications, then the lawyer and the employee have
different motivations. Therefore, the employee who talks without being a client might suffer for his cooperation. Such an employee, who
is actually willing to talk without protection of the privilege, is like
any witness who is willing to talk. The lawyer's apprehensiveness
about possibly finding out information that might turn out to be detrimental to the corporation would be no different when he seeks out
an employee than when he seeks out any other witness. The correct
question for courts to ask, therefore, is whether a witness insists
upon establishment of an attorney-client relationship and, thus, the
protection of a privilege, before speaking with the corporation's attorney. Only where the answer to this question is affirmative is the
attorney-client privilege properly applicable.121
It could be argued that there is no proof that noncorporate clients-e.g., natural persons-would refrain from talking with their
lawyers absent a privilege; indeed, there is no empirical evidence on
the point. The law of evidence assumes, however, that clients need a
privilege to encourage candor in their communications with counsel.122 As long as people seek advice and avail themselves of the priv121. The different rationales for attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine
may explain why waiver rules for the two concepts also may differ. Many courts have adopted
a strict view that once privileged communications are disclosed to third parties, the privilege is
lost. See, e.g., In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1982) (waiver by disclosure of

privileged report to underwriter). Privileged communications may not be revealed selectively to
third parties. Even where the privilege is waived, the work product doctrine may still be availa-

ble. See, e.g., Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 16 F.R.D. 5, 8 (S.D.N.Y. 1954);
Vilastor-Kent Theatre Corp. v. Brandt, 19 F.R.D. 522, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). Since the work

product doctrine is fashioned to provide parties with an incentive to gather information for use
against others, who are expected to do their own work, the fact that a party shares information
with some third parties does not necessarily mean that it must also share with those against
whom it has gathered the information.
122.

See C.

MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §
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ilege by not revealing what was said to counsel, courts may assume
that the privilege has worked as intended. When nonclient witnesses
talk to lawyers without any promise of confidentiality, the assumption must be that they are willing to talk, since that is precisely what
they are doing. It is difficult to argue, therefore, that nonclient witnesses would not speak without a privilege when, in fact, they often
do. 123 Thus, a proper analysis of corporate attorney-client privilege
requires an examination of whether corporate employees insist upon
confidentiality as a condition to speaking with corporate counsel.
V.

REFINING THE SCOPE OF CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE

Under the control group test, and especially under the scope of
employment approach, corporations are able to have the best of two
worlds. First, their attorneys have an advantage over other lawyers
in securing statements, since the corporate employer is able to exert
a coercive influence on employees to "encourage" them to talk with

its counsel. Consider Diversified Industries v. Meredith,24 for example, where the corporation's president indicated he would do
whatever was necessary to get employees to communicate with the
corporation's counsel.1 25 Similarly, in Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 26 the letter bearing the signature of Upjohn's Chairman,
which instructed all employees to cooperate fully with counsel's investigation, must have had an obvious influence on its recipients.
The threat of discharge, demotion, or simply disapproval can be used
to influence employees to say things that may be adverse to them
personally. Lawyers who are not employed by the corporation are
unlikely to have this kind of influence to assure witness
27
cooperation.1
at 192 (2d ed. 1972).
123. It is possible that more witnesses would come forward or would reveal additional
facts if they were treated as if they were clients and thus covered by the privilege. If they were
covered by the privilege, however, presumably they could insist that the party who obtained
their statements does not use them, which would mean that a party's proof would depend on
witnesses' willingness to have their statements disclosed. Moreover, the work product doctrine
implicitly rejects the idea that the danger of witnesses' lack of cooperation is sufficiently great
to provide them with the protections associated with a privilege. Witnesses who are uncooperative may be deposed in civil cases and might find themselves before grand juries or in preliminary hearings in criminal cases, where they can be compelled to provide information.
124. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977) (rehearing en banc).
125. Id. at 607.
126. 449 U.S. 383 (1981); see supra text accompanying notes 69-70.
127. A certain element of coercion is evident in the early control group decision in City
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Second, once the corporation obtains employee communications,
it freely uses them in any manner it chooses while simultaneously
claiming a privilege to prevent anyone else from using them. 128 The
corporation may fire the employee because of what it learns. In addition, it may sue the employee for any damages that it suffers as a
result of the employee's actions, using the communications in the
suit against the employee. Alternatively, it may turn the communications over to the government in an effort to use the employee as bait
for an arrangement that is favorable to the corporation. Moreover, if
the employee is sued or prosecuted, the corporation may prevent corporate counsel from providing the employee with a copy of his stateof Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 484 (E.D. Pa.) (Westinghouse
II), petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v.
Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963).
128. In Upjohn, the company argued that to focus on the possibility of disclosure as a
reason for limiting the scope of the privilege is to ignore reality, since corporations almost
never disclose communications to the detriment of their employees. Brief for Petitioners at 39
n.41, Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). The government responded that an
employee cannot rely on past experience when speaking with counsel who represents only the
corporation. See Brief for the United States and the Federal Respondent at 27 n.18, Upjohn.
In Upjohn, some of the information that the company learned as a result of counsel's investigation was turned over to the government as a result of a high level corporate decision, not a
decision by those who spoke with counsel, see Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 387, suggesting that where
the corporation will benefit from disclosure it will disclose. In fact, management probably must
do so to protect its shareholders. The company suggested that the employees' concern could be
alleviated if the Court expanded the scope of the privilege; the employees would then be confident that their communications would be more likely to be protected. See Brief for Petitioners
at 39 n.41, Upjohn. This argument, however, is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the corporation will still be inclined to waive the privilege where it works to its own advantage. Second,
and more importantly, if there is any substance to internal corporate investigations, then they
must be conducted to expose and to eradicate wrongdoing, fraud, crime, and other acts that
might subject the corporation to liability, prosecution, and perhaps even embarrassment. This
cannot be done if the employees and officials responsible for a corporation's problems never
suffer as a result of an investigation. If they may suffer, then they may be hurt by communicating with counsel. Moreover, if they are promised that they cannot be hurt, then there is
little reason to afford a privilege, since the corporation apparently is simply going through the
motions and not really trying to improve things. Either way, there is no reason to extend the
privilege to employees who are not guaranteed control over the use and distribution of their
statements to counsel.
In Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Considerationof the CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege, 57
N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 465 (1982), the suggestion is made that absent a privilege, a corporate
employee would fear that he could not be candid with the corporation. Since the corporation
can coerce employee statements and is not required to refrain from using them to the employee's disadvantage, it is difficult to see how a corporate privilege protects the employee.
Moreover, in the situation where the employee is likely to be most concerned about disclosure-where he has engaged in gross misconduct-the corporation is more likely to use the
information to his detriment. A privilege will not give him an incentive to tell the truth. He
will have an incentive to lie to protect himself whether or not there is a privilege.
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ment. 129 Similarly, others desiring to use the employee's statements
must also surmount the privilege claim.
There is a way, however, of defining the scope of the corporate
attorney-client privilege so that it is consistent with its basic rationale and so that it provides sufficient, but not excessive, protection for
communications by corporate employees to corporate counsel. The
privilege should cover all communications made for the purpose of
securing legal advice for the corporation and in confidence to corporate counsel by a person or group of persons who have the authority
to control the subsequent use and distribution of the communications. Communications by other employees may be protected by the
work product doctrine, if made while the corporation is contemplating possible litigation. 130
This approach is certainly narrower than any scope of employment test of attorney-client privilege and is distinguishable from a
control group approach. As long as the person who communicates
with counsel is given authority to determine whether counsel may
share the communications with others, such person need not be part
of what might normally be thought of as the control group to claim
the privilege for the corporation. Furthermore, someone who is in the
traditionally perceived control group for most purposes, but who is
under investigation by the corporation, would be unable to claim the
privilege for the corporation where others are to decide what to do
with his communications.
Only where control over the use of the communications is provided to the employee who speaks with counsel is it possible to make
one of the assumptions necessary to justify an absolute corporate attorney-client privilege: namely, that the client might not be forthright without a privilege. This approach is similar to requiring that
to claim the privilege an employee must also be an independent client of the corporation's counsel. Of course, an employee who is a
joint client can claim the privilege to prevent disclosure of his state129. This might not appear important, since it might be assumed that the employee
must know what he told counsel. A prior statement might be useful, however, as a prior consistent statement, see FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B), or as a statement of state of mind, see FED.
R. EVID. 803(3), and might be important to an employee's case. If the corporation has the
privilege, it may decide whether to disclose the statements.
130. To qualify as work product, material must be prepared when litigation is viewed as
reasonably possible, see, e.g., United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981), not
simply as a remote possibility, see, e.g., In re Special September 1978 Grand Jury (II), 640
F.2d 49, 65 (7th Cir. 1980).
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ments to outsiders.""a As a joint client, the corporate employee would
share control over the use of his communications with the corporation and could prevent disclosure to third parties. 3 2 He could use his
133
communications in litigation between himself and the corporation.
In addition, the lawyer asking him questions would owe him the
same fiduciary duty owed to any other client. 1 '
It should not be necessary, however, for the employee also to be
a client for the corporate privilege to be applicable to his statements,
as long as the employee has the authority on behalf of the corporation to decide whether his communications may be disclosed. If the
131. In a case like Upjohn, this might have been very important. Were the employees
joint clients, they would have the right to prevent any communications from being revealed to
the government and they could have insisted that their lawyer not volunteer information based
on their communications to the government. The attorney would have owed them a fiduciary
responsibility that he did not owe to them under the actual facts of Upjohn. In Sexton, supra
note 128, at 505, 508-10, the argument is made that employees should have the right to assert
the privilege. If they are co-holders, it is clear that they have this right. Of course, if they are
deemed co-holders, then there is not much need to worry about the scope of the privilege, for
natural persons can become joint clients and share a privilege. See, e.g., Continental Oil Co. v.
United States, 330 F.2d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1964). The significant thing about the broad corporate attorney-client privilege, however, is that it gives the corporation protection, but not the
employee.
If the corporation holds the privilege, not the employee, it can choose whether or not to
waive its protection without any concern for the employee. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 570 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1978) (former corporate vice-president could not claim privilege after corporation waived it); United States v. Piccini, 412 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 917 (1970) (corporate officer could not claim privilege with respect to his
communications to attorney for corporation); see also United States v. De Lillo, 448 F. Supp.
840 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (former trustee of pension fund could not claim individual privilege after
present board waived it).
132. See, e.g., Continental Oil Co. v. United States, 330 F.2d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1964).
133. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 503 (d)(5), 56 F.R.D. 183, 237 (1972) (proposed rule, not
enacted) (The rule would have permitted joint clients to offer communications made in confidence in an action between themselves, but would have recognized the privilege in an action
between one joint client and a third party.).
134. There is a danger confronting the employee in the joint client situation. The employee might want legal advice that may be premised upon information that could result in
disciplinary action against him or in his discharge, if disclosed to corporate officials. Naturally,
the corporation might want to distribute this information to its officials so that appropriate
disciplinary measures 'are taken. If counsel for the corporation fully considered the possible
conflicts of interest at the outset of an investigation, before taking any statement from an
employee, counsel could avoid representing both the employee and the corporation where their
interests were potentially divergent. Yet, counsel paid by the corporation may tend to overlook
some potential conflicts, and employees may not realize until disciplined or discharged that
information given to counsel accounted for the action taken against them. It would seem that a
joint client arrangement should require that the employee be told who in the corporate structure will receive information concerning the employee's communications. Only these persons
would share the privilege on behalf of the corporation with the employee. Disclosure to other
corporate officials would be improper.
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corporate employee is told that counsel will not disclose his communications without his consent, it is reasonable to assume that the employee will be as candid as he otherwise would be were he also a
client of the lawyer. Although the corporation's lawyer may not be
rendering advice to the employee personally, the corporation may
still allow the employee to control the distribution of his
communications.
In many situations, the corporation will want to give someone
other than the employee who makes the communications the decision
on how to use them, since, as previously discussed, it might want to
take corrective action against wayward employees and even assist
outside agencies in remedial actions against such employees. 13 5 In
many instances, control over communications would be limited to
persons who fall within what has become traditionally known as the
control group. It is inevitable that what might be in the best interests
of an individual employee, especially a lower echelon employee,
might not be in the best interests of the corporation. Nothing in the
approach proposed here would require corporations to afford all employees control over distribution of their communications to counsel.
Yet, where the employees are not assured that they will control distribution of their communications, the corporation will be able to
claim, at most, work product protection for statements that are
made.
A claim might be made that this proposed approach ignores the
fact that when corporate counsel talks to a corporate employee it is
as if the corporation were talking to itself. The truth is, however,
that the corporation and the employee may have very different interests. For example, there have been frequent problems of conflict of
interests for attorneys who represent both a corporation and its employee, where the employee might be personally vulnerable.1 13 A corporation knowing that an employee might be in a better position if
he does not talk with corporate counsel, may, nevertheless, want to
get information from the employee and may pressure the employee
for information without affording him control over his communication. If it is successful, then the corporation will, ironically, claim
privilege to protect whatever it learns. Under these circumstances it
135. See supra text accompanying notes 128-30.
136. On conflicts of interest, see Leary, Is There a Conflict in Representinga Corporation and Its IndividualEmployees? 36 Bus. LAw. 591 (1981); see also Nath, supra note 47,
at 68-75 (ethical and constitutional dimensions of the conflicts of interest issue); supra note
134.
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is obvious that the privilege would do little more than enable the
corporation to conceal information, rather than encourage the employee to speak, since the employee is speaking at his own risk without any promise of confidentiality.
In addition to the foregoing claim against the proposed approach, advocates of a broader corporate privilege might assert that
no real harm is done when the privilege for corporations is expanded
to, for example, a scope of employment test, since adverse parties
can engage in discovery to obtain the facts they need to know. When
a natural person asserts attorney-client privilege, it may be fair to
.assume that adverse parties may discover needed facts with reasonable ease. In the noncorporate situation, it would be clear from whom
discovery should be sought; discovery through depositions and interrogatories directed at the party claiming privilege would be, in all
likelihood, an efficient way to discover information. This may not be
assumed, however, where a corporation is a party. The larger the
enterprise is that invokes a privilege, the harder it becomes to take
depositions, and the more likely it is that some people with information will be beyond the reach of the discovery process. This is not an
argument against a privilege for corporations, but it is a reason not
to expand a privilege beyond the rationale that supports it.
Advocates of a broader privilege for corporations might rely
upon an evidentiary difference between statements made by a corporate employee to the corporation's lawyer and statements made by
any other witness to that lawyer. Anything that the corporate employee says that is relevant to employment, if discovered and offered
by an opponent, is likely to be admissible under recent evidence
codifications as an agent's admission. 3 7 It is less likely that statements by witnesses not employed by the corporation would be admitted as substantive evidence. 138 Nevertheless, any statements that are
discovered and used as admissions are admitted, not simply as a result of blind adherence to agency principles, but because they are
made under circumstances that suggest they are sufficiently reliable
to be used against a principal or employer.13 9
137. See FED. R. EvID. 801 (d)(2)(D); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Illinois
Cent. Gulf R.R., 615 F.2d 470 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980); Carl Wagner &
Sons v. Appendagez, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 762, 774 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
138. These statements often will be hearsay. They will not become adoptive admissions
under FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B) without some showing that the party who obtained the
statements explicitly or implicitly accepted them as true.
139. In other words, the statements are not necessarily accepted on the theory that if
principals are responsible for the acts of their agents, they should be responsible for their
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The basic theories underlying the admissions exception are that

the person who made the admission is hardly in a position to complain that he is unable to cross-examine himself about the out of
court statement and that a person should be responsible for what he
says.140 Naturally, when a statement by one person is admitted
against another, this reasoning breaks down. One person is not always in a position to explain deficiencies in another's statement. The
theory of admitting certain employee statements against an employer
is that an employee is unlikely to make untrue statements that relate
to his employment while he is employed."" False statements might
hurt the employer and may ultimately cost the employee his job, or,
at least, may place the employee in a worse position than he otherwise would have been in if he did not make the statement. Whether
employees of large corporations are always careful about what they
say is debatable. Certainly, when they are asked leading questions,
perhaps by skilled counsel in the course of an interview, they may
make statements that they really do not intend. Yet, the trend is to
permit the statements to be used against tie employer.1 42 It should
not be disturbing, therefore, that statements made by the corporation's employees to its counsel, if discoverable, might be used as admissions. The corporation can be protected if its counsel, who has
every reason to act in the corporation's best interests, asks the employees to be careful in what they say to either the corporation's
counsel or outside attorneys. It is especially important to note that
the employee may be persuaded or compelled to explain any statements he makes to corporate counsel. Thus, there is every reason to
conclude that these statements ought to be admitted as reliable if the
work product doctrine does not prevent their discovery.
Even a nonemployee witness' statements, if discovered, may be
admitted as evidence, though not necessarily substantively. They
may be used to impeach the witness,1 43 or they may qualify under
agents' statements as well. The rationale for the rule is that a person has an incentive, while
retained as an agent, not to say things that may hurt the principal; hence, when such statements are made their reliability is believed to be great. See REPORT, NEW JERSEY SUPREME
COURT, COMMITrTEE ON EvIDENCE 165-67 (1963).
140. See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 112, at 383-84.
141. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
142. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D); see also cases cited supra note 137.
143. In Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947), the Supreme Court recognized
the impeachment value of statements obtained in writing from a witness. At the same time, it
suggested that oral statements recorded by counsel probably would not be admissible for any

purpose. See Id. at 512-13. This suggestion, though perhaps sound at one time, is no longer
valid. It may be true that attorneys would have to authenticate memoranda summarizing or
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some exception to the hearsay rule, though as previously mentioned,
this would not be as likely.144 There is no rule, of course, that work
product should be immunized from discovery simply because it
might be useful as evidence for the discovering party. In fact, the
more useful the work product would be as evidence, the easier it
should be for a litigant to make the showing of need required to
support discovery.
Therefore, the mere fact that employee statements may be admissible as evidence does not mean that they should be protected by
the attorney-client privilege. As long as it is evident that a witness,
whether an employee or not, will talk with counsel without a guarantee of confidentiality, the rationale for applying the privilege to the
witness' communications disappears.
Thus, the proposed approach provides a corporate attorney-client privilege only in those instances where confidentiality, i.e., control over the subsequent use and distribution of communications, is
promised to the person who makes the statements, thereby leaving
work product to cover any other communications made in anticipation of litigation. Naturally, where a corporation obtains communications that are not protected by the attorney-client privilege at a
time when no litigation is reasonably contemplated or threatened, it
will have no doctrine on which to rely to resist discovery of those
communications. Yet, when no litigation is reasonably contemplated
or threatened, there is little need to provide an incentive for corporations to seek out information. It is to be expected that they will seek
the legal advice they need, for they have little to fear where litigarecording a witness' statement and that attorneys are witnesses of last resort. See MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(B) (1980) (enumerating four instances
where a lawyer may testify as a witness and remain in a representive capacity in the case); Cf.
id. DR 5-102 ("Withdrawal as Counsel When the Lawyer Becomes a Witness"). Yet, in some
cases, attorneys do testify, and attorneys certainly could lay the foundation necessary for the
use of their memoranda.
An accurate summary might qualify for admission under FED. R. EVID. 803(5), if a witness suffered memory loss at trial. If statements were taken immediately after an event, they
might be present sense impressions or excited utterances under FED. R. EvID. 803(l),(2). Even
if no traditional hearsay rule were satisfied, they might be admissible under the residual exceptions found in FED. R. EVID. 803(24) and FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(5).
One of the reasons why corporations would continue to take statements from their own
employees, even without the absolute protection of the attorney-client privilege, is that the
corporation is likely to know, before outsiders, that the employees have knowledge of relevant
facts. This not only gives the corporation initial access to the employees, but it also increases
the likelihood that the statements, if favorable to the corporation, might qualify for admission
under a hearsay exception.
144. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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tion is not in the offing. This places corporations in the same position
as any other person who needs to rely on information that is not
confidential at a time when litigation is not on the horizon.
Since most important corporate decisions requiring advice of
counsel are likely to be made by people who have the authority to
control the use of their communications, presumably communications to counsel in relation to important legal questions often will be
privileged under the proposed approach. As in the control group and
scope of employment approaches, corporate officers and corporate
boards most in need of legal advice will be able to obtain that advice
without losing the benefits of the privilege in most instances. The
principal force of the analysis suggested here, however, is to prevent
corporations from placing the umbrella of the privilege over the
many lower echelon employees not promised confidentiality, whose
information most often will be important when litigation is forseeable and the corporation is seeking to prepare for it. In these situations, only the work product doctrine should apply. As demonstrated
above, it provides sufficient incentives for corporations to gather
information.
To the extent that corporations are decentralized and middle
management consult with counsel, the privilege should attach to
management communications in the course of seeking legal advice,
since middle management will probably have control over the subsequent use of their communications. Only where middle level officials
are investigated by higher level officials are communications by the
middle level officials unlikely to be privileged. Yet, it is important to
note that any investigation is likely to imply a possibility of future
litigation, which may trigger work product protection.
Should a corporation desire to provide legal services to its officers or employees as a fringe benefit, the privilege will belong to the
individual, not to the corporation; unless, absent a conflict of interest,
corporate counsel represented the corporation and its officials simultaneously, which would mean that the individuals would share with
the corporation authority to claim and waive the privilege.
As is the case under Upjohn Co. v. United States,1 45 if the corporation gathers information for business or commercial use, that information is not privileged. Similarly, such information is not work
product since it is not gathered because litigation is reasonably foreseeable. Corporate officials who meet the privilege test proposed
145.

449 U.S. 383 (1981).
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herein, however, may communicate with counsel for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice or services concerning any aspect of the corporation's activities. The legal services, of course, may relate to either
business or commercial matters. In the course of such discussions
with counsel, corporate officials may talk about underlying facts that
are not themselves privileged. The nonprivileged facts would be discoverable in subsequent litigation, since they cannot be imunized
from discovery simply by a discussion about them in a privileged
context. 14 The actual statements, however, made by corporate officials to counsel about the nonprivileged facts would be within the
privilege and, therefore, protected from discovery.
Under the proposed analysis, communications by counsel tending to reveal protected matters would also be privileged, as under
current law. Thus, counsel's opinion would be privileged to the extent that it might reveal communications by a person with control
over the use of his statements. Moreover, as is currently true, reports
prepared by a corporation's outside consultants would not be privileged, while any communications by corporate officials or boards
with counsel about the experts' reports would be privileged. Of
course, if the reports were prepared for use in foreseeable litigation,
they would be protected by the work product doctrine. Furthermore,
all proprietary information might come within the trade secrets privilege, 147 even if it is outside the attorney-client privilege.
In sum, the proposed approach would not inhibit corporate officials from seeking legal advice. In fact, it would afford substantial
protection to the most important communications that corporate officials are likely to make to counsel. Simultaneously, the approach
would refine the corporate privilege so that it does not extend to
statements made by employees and officers whom the corporation is
investigating.
Under this new analysis, the statements in Harper & Row Publishers v. Decker,4 I Diversified Industries v. Meredith,49 and
Upjohn Co. v. United States' 50 would not have been within the attorney-client privilege. They almost certainly would have been work
146. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
147. FED. R. EVID. 508, 56 F.R.D. 183, 249-50 (1972) (proposed rule, not enacted).
148. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), affd by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348
(1971); see supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
149. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (rehearing en banc); see supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
150. 449 U.S. 383 (1981); see supra notes 67-80 and accompanying text.
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product, however, and it is doubtful that any necessity would have
justified discovery of what the courts found to be privileged. As for
City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,151 assuming
that the privilege claim was directed at communications and was not
an effort to resist questions about the events that occured, a privilege
would have existed if the persons who communicated with counsel
had been guaranteed control over their communications. If they had
not been promised such control, then the work product doctrine
would, again, almost certainly have protected the communications
from disclosure. This is important because it demonstrates that even
where a corporate attorney-client privilege is not as broad as some
corporations would prefer, the work product doctrine is likely to protect the results of most internal investigations of possible criminal
acts by employees or other acts that might possibly result in liability
on the part of the corporation. In addition, since corporations not
only have reason to want to know as early as possible about potential
liability, but also may have a special duty to their investors to make
investigations, it is doubtful that, in the absence of an absolute corporate attorney-client privilege, corporations will lack the incentive
to investigate, especially when the work product rule makes it likely
that investigations will not be disclosed.
The difference between work product and attorney-client privilege protection may be important in some cases, since the work product doctrine will permit discovery where an absolute privilege would
not. Consider, for instance, D.L Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior
Court,152 which is similar to a hypothetical considered earlier.1 53 The
case arose when Constance Smith fell on a sidewalk, and she and her
husband sued D.I. Chadbourne, Inc., claiming that the fall was a
result of its negligence. One of the company's employees had performed work on the sidewalk, but at the time of the litigation was
stationed with the United States Armed Forces in Germany. The
employee had previously given a statement to counsel, but the company refused to disclose it, claiming attorney-client privilege. 1 " In
the course of denying a writ of mandate to overturn the lower court's
151. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.), petition for writs of mandamus and prohibitiondenied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372

U.S. 943 (1963); see supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
152. 60 Cal. 2d 723, 388 P.2d 700, 36 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1964).

153. The case is similar to the first hypothetical involving Shirley's repair of a sidewalk
in front of her bar, see supra text accompanying note 35, except that Chadbourneinvolved a

corporation.
154.

Chadbourne, 60 Cal. 2d at 728, 388 P.2d 700, 703, 36 Cal. Rptr. 468, 471-72.
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determination of the privilege claim, the California Supreme Court
set forth an eleven part test that would have protected an employee's
statements to corporate counsel if they were required by the corporation as part of its ordinary course of business.' 55 Such a test, however, extends the corporate privilege too far. If the employee made
the statement without any guarantee that he would have control over
its use, there is no reason to view it as privileged and to give the
corporation the exclusive right to use it. Had the plaintiff taken the
statement before the employee left the country and before filing suit,
the corporation would have been able to obtain it upon a showing of
hardship and need. Therefore, equity seems to require that the plaintiff should be given a similar opportunity under the work product
doctrine to obtain the statement. Chadbourneillustrates why the distinction between work product and attorney-client privilege is important and how an overbroad approach to the privilege could result in
a significant loss of evidence.
Recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the need to
avoid an overly broad definition of the privilege as it held that statements made to a railroad company's "investigator-employee" by
members of a switching crew concerning an accident in which a fellow crew member was injured were not privileged, because the crew
members were "witnesses" and not part of an attorney-client relationship.156 A dissenting opinion relied on Upjohn to conclude that
the statements were privileged. 15 7 One concurring opinion voiced
concern about small closely held corporations and suggested that
158
statements by their owner-employees might be treated differently.
Similarly, the California Supreme Court in Chadbourne had also attempted to distinguish between employees who were mere witnesses
and employees who communicated to counsel in the course of their
employment. 159 It is not surprising that these courts sought some
way of limiting the scope of corporate privilege. The fact that a person is an employee of a corporation should not automatically entitle
the corporation to claim a privilege for communications by that person to corporate counsel. Rather, something more is needed: namely,
155. See id. at 737, 388 P.2d at 709-10, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 477-78.
156. Leer v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry., 308 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1981) cert. denied,
455 U.S. 939 (1982).

157. Id. at 310 (Otis, J., dissenting) ("Statements taken from those members of the
switching crew whose negligence is alleged to have caused plaintiff's injuries" should be
privileged.).

158. Id. at 309-10 (Simonett, J., concurring specially).
159.

Chadbourne, 60 Cal. 2d at 737, 388 P.2d 700, 709, 36 Cal. Rptr. 468, 477.
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a showing that the employees were guaranteed confidentiality when
they spoke to counsel. Where this is not the case, and the employees
freely confided in counsel, the rationale for the attorney-client privilege is inapplicable.
If the approach recommended here is adopted, there will be little need to struggle with defining a control group or to develop complex rules to inhibit corporations from expanding a scope of employment test to the point where they insulate most corporate documents
from disclosure. Furthermore, the new approach addresses the Supreme Court's concern for clarity16 0 more effectively than either of
the leading tests of privilege and still supports the privilege's basic
rationale. Thus, when clarity is provided in a manner which is consistent with the rationale of the attorney-client privilege, the resulting approach should be sound.
VI.

APPLICATION OF THE APPROACH TO NONCORPORATE
CLIENTS

This new approach is useful in governing the attorney-client
privilege not only for corporations, but also for any other person or

entity-i.e., a natural person, a partnership, an unincorporated association, or a union-using an agent while seeking legal advice. One
of the reasons why the law of corporate privilege has been in disar-

ray for so long is that most commentators and courts have never
really paid sufficient attention to how agents are utilized in the
course of a client's seeking legal advice. Upjohn cited authority in its
brief to the Supreme Court that appeared to suggest that any time a
person retained an agent and that agent talked with the client's lawyer as part of the agency arrangement, a privilege could be claimed
by the client.16 ' Even Wigmore 6 2 and McCormick 63 can be read to
support his argument. The rationale for attorney-client privilege,
however, does not support it.
Courts and commentators have opined, with little apparent
analysis, that the attorney-client privilege should be applied identically in four factually different situations where soneone other than,
or in addition to, the client communicates with counsel. These situa160.
161.
(1981).
162.
Naughton
163.

See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393.
See Brief for Petitioners at 31-32, Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383
8 J. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE INTRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2317, at 618-19 (J. Mcrev. ed. 1961).
See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 122, § 91, at 188-89.
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tions will be more properly analyzed below, since one of these factual
settings is distinguishable and should result in an application of the
approach suggested herein.
First, there are situations in which a client utilizes assistance in
communicating with a lawyer.1 For instance, a client who speaks
only Spanish may need an interpreter to communicate with a lawyer
who speaks only English. What the client says to the interpreter for
transmission to the lawyer is privileged if it would have been privileged had the client spoken directly to the lawyer.16 5 The client decides how much information to disclose and the existence of the privilege can affect that decision. Similarly, if the client utilizes a
stenographer or secretary to assist in recording a statement for transmission to counsel, as long as it would have been privileged had the
client written it personally and handed it to counsel, the communication is still probably privileged.16 6 Once again, the client chooses
what to tell the lawyer, and may not be forthright without the assurance of the privilege. The client-and no one else-controls the decision to speak as well as the distribution and the use of the statements
made. Hence, the applicability of the privilege in these situations is
clear.
Second, there are cases where the client communicates with the
lawyer in the presence of a third party. 67 In some situations, the
third person may appear to be the equivalent of an interpreter and
the above analysis would apply.16 8 In other situations, the client is
too nervous or frightened to talk to the lawyer without the comfort
of someone else. 69 In these settings as well, the client makes a decision about what to disclose, and the privilege may be as important in
the client's decision as it would be for a client in any other situation.
The assumption of these cases appears to be that the other person
who is present is simply an agent of the client who neither has control over the decision to speak nor any authority concerning the dis164. See generally id., § 91, at 187-89 (discussing the presence of third parties and
agents during client communications).
165. See, e.g., United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921-22 (2d Cir. 1961) (drawing
analogy between accountant and interpreter).
166. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 162, § 2301, at 583.
167. See, e.g., Foley v. Poschke, 137 Ohio St. 593, 31 N.E.2d 845 (1941) (detective
present during consultation by client with attorney).
168. See Saltzburg, supra note 11, at 643-45.
169. See, e.g., Bowers v. State, 29 Ohio St. 542 (1876) (mother present when daughter
talked to lawyer about proceeding regarding indictment for seduction).
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tribution and use of the statements made by the client.17 0 Similar to

the first type of factual settings, the rationale for the privilege supports its application in these cases. 7"
Third, there are cases where the attorney has a secretary, law
clerk, or other professional present to help him ask questions or record information provided by the client.1 72 As in the first two lines of
cases, the client decides what to tell the lawyer and the privilege
remains applicable. 17 3 The employee of the attorney is viewed as being bound by the ethical rules that govern the attorney, 17 4 which
means that the client retains control over the decision to speak as
well as over the distribution and use of any statements made. Thus,
throughout all three lines of decisions, the basic requirement that the
client be the one to choose how much to disclose and also have control over distribution and use of whatever is said is satisfied.
This is not the situation, however, in the fourth line of cases
where A retains a lawyer and asks B to tell the lawyer what B
knows. In the case of Shirley, the sole proprietor, 17 5 for example,

Shirley might ask Mary and Jean, her employees, to talk to her lawyer. If Mary and Jean decide for themselves whether to talk and
how much to disclose, but Shirley alone controls the use and distribution of what Mary and Jean say, no privilege should attach. The
rationale for the privilege is as inapplicable here as in the corporate
setting where employees communicate with counsel without having
control over their communications. This may have been why in
Hickman
the Supreme Court was so quick to dismiss the privilege
6
claim.

17

170. See, e.g., Id. at 546 ("the mother in such a case. . . [was] acting in the character
of confidential agent of her daughter").
171. See also infra note 173.
172. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 162, § 2301, at 583.
173. See Id. Although courts do not always seem to insist upon it, it would appear that
the use of agents to assist in communications and the sharing of communications with them
should be limited to situations in which it is reasonably necessary for agents to be used or for
them to know of communications. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 503(a)(4), 56 F.R.D. 183, 236 (1972)
(proposed rule, not enacted; defining a confidential communication and noting the necessary
third parties to whom communication may be disclosed without loss of confidential status).
This would insure that communications are not distributed so broadly that the case for a privilege to protect a private zone of communications cannot be made. Note that a similar restriction was placed on the distribution of statements made by corporate employees in Diversified
Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (rehearing en banc).
174. See, e.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 177 S.E. 582 (Ga. Sup. Ct. 1934) (attorney's confidential secretary).
175. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
176. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947); see supra notes 96-99 and accompa-
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If the analysis proposed herein is rejected in this fourth category
of cases, and a rule is applied that permits clients to claim the privilege for any statements of their agents, the consequences may be
unfortunate. For example, conceivably all statements by witnesses,
even those of nonemployees, could be transformed into communications protected by an attorney-client privilege. Since lawyers can offer reasonable witness fees to witnesses who talk with them, any witness who accepts a fee might be deemed an agent of the client on
whose behalf the lawyer asks questions. Even without a fee, lawyers
could ask a witness to give a statement on behalf of a client. If a
principal can claim privilege for any statement by an agent, any witness' statements may be absolutely privileged.177 Upjohn, and many
other corporations, may respond that these witnesses may be agents
of a sort, but that they are not employees. This tautology cannot be
challenged, but it begs the real question: What difference does it
make whether they are agents of a sort or employees if, at the time
they talk to a lawyer, they understand that they are talking on behalf of the client? Why should a person be in a better position when
his employees have information than when third parties, equally willing to cooperate, do? When people talk to counsel without relying on
a guarantee of confidentiality, whether they are employees or merely
agents of a sort, there is no reason to hold their communications to
be privileged.
As the scope of corporate attorney-client privilege becomes
nying text.
177. Some cases, without much reasoning, would appear to be willing to extend the privilege this far. See, e.g., State v. Bell, 212 Mo. 111, 111 S.W. 24 (1908) (wife's statement to
husband's attorney privileged); In re Aspinwall, 2 F. Cas. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1874) (No. 591)
(Statements by third party to attorney regarding his client held privileged). These are old
eases, the first of which might have been justified by combining the marital communications
privilege and the attorney-client privilege. Both cases were decided before the work product
doctrine was well established. With the development of that doctrine, however, there is no
longer any reason to extend the attorney-client privilege to cover such a situation.
Some writers after Upjohn, nevertheless, appear willing to extend the privilege almost as
far as the older cases. For example, in Hellerstein & Ringel, Current Problems about the
Attorney-Client Privilege,in 1 ALI-ABA, CIVIL PRACTICE AND LITIGATION IN FEDERAL AND
STATE COURTS 87, 96 (1981) (ALI-ABA Resource Materials), the argument is made that as
to a number of people whom Upjohn interviewed after they left the company's employ, the

company should still be able to assert a privilege to protect them because "the privilege belongs to Upjohn, not the employees." A similar claim is made in Richardson, FormerEmployees as Witnesses, LITIGATION, Summer 1983, at 35. Obviously, this begs the question whether
there is a privilege for communications by ex-employees. They are almost certainly the

equivalent of third party witnesses once their employment ends. An even broader claim of
privilege is made by Sexton, supra note 128, at 498-99, in an argument that potentially could
extend the corporate privilege to almost anyone with whom a corporation deals.
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clear, it should be easier to rule on the privileged status of other
agents' statements. While there may be more recent cases involving
corporations than noncorporate businesses and entities,17 8 the discussion of corporate privilege facilitates the consideration of privilege
claims for other entities and natural persons that also employ agents.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Some privileges are justified on the basis of notions about fundamental decency as well as on the basis of instrumental arguments.1 9 The attorney-client privilege, however, is different. Its
reach in the noncorporate context is sharply confined. People who
seek business advice from lawyers can claim no privilege.180 People
who communicate information to lawyers that is unrelated to the legal services they seek similarly have no privilege. 81 Where no privilege is needed to promote candid communications between a client
and his lawyer, no privilege is provided. The same should be true in
the context of corporations utilizing lawyers. A privilege should exist
only where it is assumed to be indispensable to enhance candor on
the part of the people from whom corporate counsel would seek
information.
Neither the two major approaches to corporate privilege-the
control group and scope of employment tests-nor the Supreme
Court's recent opinion in Upjohn Co. v. United States,18 2 pays sufficient attention to the rationale for attorney-client privilege. By focusing on that rationale and by explaining that the important question
in implementing a corporate attorney-client privilege is whether confidentiality appeared to be necessary to generate communications
from employees to corporate counsel, this article offers a new approach.18 3 This approach identifies work product as the doctrine that
178. This may be explained by the fact that when a business is small and has few employees, generally they can be interviewed or deposed by an adverse party without great difficulty. Thus, the work product rule generally will protect an employer who has obtained employee statements, without relying on the privilege.
179. The privilege against self-incrimination is perhaps the best example. In Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964), the Court referred to the privilege as reflecting
"our respect for the inviolability of the human personality."
180. See, e.g., United States v. Huberts, 637 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1980).
181. See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 122, § 88 (detailing the circumstances
under which a "professional relationship" exists for purposes of invoking the privilege).
182. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
183. The approach recommended here should enable courts to respond to new situations
without much difficulty. For example, where special counsel is appointed whose duty is to the
court and the public, e.g., SEC v. Canadian Javelin Ltd., 451 F. Supp. 594 (D.D.C. 1978),
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is intended to provide parties and their counsel with an incentive to
investigate and classifies the attorney-client privilege as the doctrine
that is intended to promote candor on the part of clients who talk
with attorneys. Therefore, the analysis proposed herein differentiates
communications that properly fall within the work product doctrine,
and are only conditionally protected against disclosure, from communications deserving of the absolute protection of the attorney-client
privilege.

communications by employees to such counsel will not involve a promise of confidentiality and
no privilege should be available to the corporation with respect to such communications.
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